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1 
 
Globalization is a discourse that has far-reaching implications for 
the political identities of citizens throughout the world.  Through 
rhetorical analysis of a 2001 World Bank report on Globalization, 
Growth and Poverty,   I examine how international financial 
institutions (IFIs) attempt to normalize citizen deference to 
economic policymaking that occurs outside democratic 
institutions.1  Focusing on the mundane world of public-relations 
texts can help round out the conversation between Thomas 
Friedman and anarchists masked by black bandanas (the Black 
Bloc).  While glamorous faces garner attention from media and 
scholars, the researchers and project directors at places like the 
World Bank undertake the quieter work of advocating and 
implementing life-changing policies.  Their reports, pamphlets, 
and educational materials try to persuade the public that their 
recommendations are the best courses of action.2 
 
 
2 
 
The publication analyzed here is especially interesting because it 
appeared as the so-called “anti-globalization” movement gathered 
strength to threaten neo-liberalism.3  By “neo-liberal,” I mean 
policies that assume markets are the basic elements of economies 
and can do no wrong.  Neo-liberals treat markets as the most 
efficient means for a nearly infinite variety of ends.  They advocate 
removing trade barriers, deregulating or privatizing state services, 
reducing taxes, and tight budgets so capital can flow freely 
between states.  This makes governments and politics secondary, 
devoted to serving market efficiency. 
 
 
3 
 
The analysis begins with “Fixing a Hole Where the Rain Comes In” 
to review the increasing criticism faced by advocates of 
globalization.  Following is a discussion of three rhetorical 
characteristics of Globalization, Growth and Poverty.  “The 
Realist Style” traces the ways IFI discourse uses metonymy to 
reduce politics to interests and competition.  This style, a wayward 
descendant of Greek parrhesia (frankness), characterizes the 
speaker as unbiased, frank, and particularly clear-sighted.  It 
denigrates other modes of seeing and speaking as naïve or 
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interested.  This implies that it is possible and desirable to speak 
from an impartial position.  In this way, realist rhetoric attempts to 
preclude criticism from opponents. “Branding ‘Globalization’” 
discusses how the report,  buttressed by its realist tone, touts neo-
liberal globalization as the way to aid the world’s poor.  The link 
between this form of world economy and poverty reduction 
selectively omits evidence.  “Ironic Appropriations” examines how 
pro-globalization discourse responds to critical counter-publics by 
hegemonizing their values.  It constructs trade openness as the 
only way to achieve a variety of public goods beyond poverty 
alleviation.  In this ironic re-appropriation of the “agenda of the 
streets,” the realist IFI discourse tries to subsume the most salient 
critiques of neo-liberal globalization, including environmental 
protection and cultural diversity.  It even claims to represent 
values that previously served as critical counter-norms.4 
 
4 
 
Then “Technocracy and the Public” focuses on how free-market 
discourse works for a voluntarily non-participatory public through 
its assumptions about economics and politics.  In an effort to delay 
final judgment on the neo-liberal agenda, its advocates exhort 
critics to maintain the faith.  They claim that all concerns can yet 
find accommodation within a market solution.  They argue that 
neo-liberal policy-makers are not partial but objective analysts 
who practice a science of economics.  If economics were akin to a 
pure science, capable of providing a single, necessary prescription 
for solving each problem, and if “the market” could address a wide 
variety of social goals, there would be little need for political 
activity.  In the end, “Possibilities For a Counter-Hegemonic 
Project” assesses the potential for sustained opposition to neo-
liberal globalization, given the hegemonizing power of IFI 
discourse. 
 
 
 
 Fixing a Hole Where the Rain Comes In  
 
5 
 
In recent decades, international financial institutions have gained 
greater influence over decision-making processes around the 
globe.  Many IFIs, like the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, originated with the goal of promoting economic 
development to stem poverty.  Yet the type of development IFIs 
endorse has come to have a distinctly neo-liberal flavor.  While the 
World Bank has been less aggressive in pursuing such policies than 
its sister institution, the IMF, its “Private Sector Development 
Strategy” belies the Bank’s claim to seek a variety of approaches.  
Instead it favors delivery of services by the private sector and 
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continues to make “investment climate assessments” in line with 
neo-liberalism.  The Bretton Woods institutions have moved 
toward greater policy coordination with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), an institution with a mandate is to “ensure 
that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible.”5  
Meanwhile numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and civil-society leaders complain about the lack of transparency 
and democratic input in these institutions.6 
 
6 
 
These developments may be compatible with expert-driven or 
technocratic politics, except that the type of “free trade” promoted 
is the subject of great debate among economists and generates 
increasing anxiety for the public.  Several outspoken critics of free 
trade, including the former chief economist of the World Bank, 
Joseph Stiglitz, have pointed to the failures of market liberalization 
as advocated by IFIs.7  According to economist Dani Rodrick, 
“countries that have bought wholeheartedly into the integration 
orthodoxy are discovering that openness does not deliver on its 
promise.”8  On the contrary, “the evidence from the experience of 
the last two decades is quite clear:  The countries that have grown 
the most rapidly since the mid-1970s are those that have invested a 
high share of GDP and maintained macroeconomic stability.  The 
relation between growth rates and indicators of openness . . . is 
weak at best.”9  The frequently mentioned success stories – China, 
India, and the “Asian Tigers” – did not achieve high levels of 
growth after implementing tariff reductions and neo-liberal 
reforms.  Instead these governments pursued a variety of policies, 
many that violate the neo-liberal terms of “free trade.” 
 
 
7 
 
Neo-liberal policies have damaged the material lives of many in 
developing countries.  Contrary to some advocates’ claims, the 
poor are disproportionately affected by liberalization.  Social safety 
nets are dismantled, and economic shocks occur with increasing 
frequency as restrictions on capital flows are lifted.  “Free trade” 
and the institutional reforms now recognized as its necessary 
corollaries require significant trade-offs that siphon scarce 
resources from programs that benefit the poor more directly.10  
Countries that have pursued liberalization seem to suffer more 
severe and frequent economic crises, which can lead in turn to 
increased economic inequality among countries.11  Inequality 
within countries also has risen.  “The connection between rapid 
trade liberalization and inequality appears to be universal, 
indicating downward wage pressures and rising inequality 
following trade liberalization in industrializing and industrialized 
economies.  A report by UNCTAD (1997) found that trade 
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liberalization in Latin America led to widening wage gaps, falling 
real wages for unskilled workers (often more than 90% of the labor 
force in developing countries), and rising inequality.”12 
 
8 
 
As Rodrick says, moreover, the most successful of the newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) did not follow neo-liberal 
orthodoxy to achieve economic growth.  Neither did the developed 
world.  Free-trade policies only formed after significant 
development, and they remain only partially implemented.  With 
boards dominated by experts from northern and western 
countries, the IMF and the World Bank are about to undertake 
greater policy coordination with the WTO.  Yet “the industrial 
countries, by violating the principles of free trade, are costing the 
developing countries an estimated $60 billion a year – nearly 
equal to the total flow of foreign assistance.”13  Protectionist 
policies were a hallmark of Western development.  “In the late 
nineteenth century . . . a protectionist America and a protectionist 
Germany both outperformed free trade Britain.14  When President 
Bush imposed temporary (and since repealed) tariffs on steel 
imports in March 2002, world leaders loudly noted the 
contradiction.  Britain’s minister of trade and industry asked, “why 
should developing countries commit to free and open markets 
when the U.S. closes its domestic market . . . ?”15  Financial 
services groups within the World Bank have been accused of 
financing the investments of large corporations, based in donor 
countries, at the expense of projects designed to help the poor 
directly.16 
 
 
9 
 
The neo-liberal policies have not proven themselves empirically.  
The LDC situation is further complicated by the fact that Western 
countries are much better equipped to handle the challenges of a 
global free trade regime.  LDCs find their range of policy options 
narrowed by free-market discourse, and they are relatively 
unprepared to handle the economic shocks and dislocations 
caused by liberalized trade.  Hence LDCs can ill afford these 
policies now, and there is little reason to believe that their 
situation will improve if the current discourse maintains its hold. 
 
 
10 
 
While Seattle demonstrators in 1999 and larger social movements 
brought the issue into the public consciousness, a former official of 
the World Bank found “a feeling that the shouts on the streets are 
echoed by murmurs inside the institutions.”17  Joseph Stiglitz 
remarked that the neo-liberal orientation of the so-called 
“Washington Consensus” has “lived on as an institutional 
position,” even though it reflects outdated thought rooted in the 
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Reagan-Thatcher era.18  He announced that he would leave the 
World Bank in late 1999:  “it has become obvious to me that it 
would be difficult to continue to speak out as forcefully and 
publicly as I have on a variety of issues and still remain as chief 
economist.”19  Stiglitz remains a critic of many of the Bank’s 
policies, challenging the claim that open markets lead to growth 
and reductions in poverty in the absence of government 
intervention. 
 
11 
 
Another World Bank economist, Ravi Kanbur, author of the 2000 
World Development Report, resigned his position in June 2000 
amid reports that his original draft (which had been posted on the 
Internet) was changed to remove calls for a “cautious approach” 
and increases in social spending along with criticisms of neo-
liberal reforms.20  The final version of the report lobbies for 
reductions in inequality; but critics remarked that it is a “Janus 
document,” where policy prescriptions vary widely chapter by 
chapter.  It calls for increased redistribution in one place then 
reasserts free-market principles in the next.21  Two other 
researchers left the Bank after being disciplined for publishing 
articles in the Financial Times without proper clearance from the 
Bank’s External Relations Department.  The World Bank staff 
newsletter for November and December of 2001 contains 
editorials in response to these cases.  They liken the External 
Relations Department to “thought police” and warn that the Bank’s 
“public image matters more than germane research findings.”22 
 
 
12 
 
Meanwhile academic criticism of World Bank and IMF policies 
persists.  Critics include Robert Wade at the London School of 
Economics, Dani Rodrick at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, 
Roberto Unger at the Harvard Law School, and Mark Weisbrot at 
the Center for Economic and Policy Research.  Stiglitz, who 
returned to academia after his resignation, reports that there is “an 
intellectual gap between what we know and what is still 
practiced.”23  Other academic economists who disagree with 
Stiglitz’s public criticism of the Bank or who lean more toward the 
free-market orientation – including Kenneth Arrow, who won the 
1972 Nobel Prize for his research on open-market efficiency – 
nonetheless acknowledge the validity of the criticisms.24 
 
 
13 
 
It is clear that neo-liberal globalization is under mounting pressure 
from within and without. Yet the lack of even greater protest 
against neo-liberal globalization is the primary concern of this 
essay.  Stuart Hall points out that “no social practice exists outside 
of the domain of the semiotic – the practices and production of 
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meaning.”25  Thus rhetorical theory can provide insight into this 
system and its response to outside pressures. 
 
14 
 
The method here is similar to Manfred Steger’s treatment of what 
he calls globalism.  “Recognizing the importance of 
communication through the media,” critical discourse analysis 
“focuses on the interpretation of coherent units of spoken and 
written language.  At the same time, it places ideas in their 
historical context . . . by scrutinizing texts in the public domain, 
critical discourse analysis is particularly suited to help the 
researcher comprehend the role played by language use in 
producing and reinforcing asymmetrical power relations that 
sustain certain forms of social and political identity.”26 
 
 
15 
 
The present method also shares much with Deirdre McCloskey’s 
rhetoric of economics.  I read Globalization, Growth and Poverty 
as a text with four elements:  fact, logic, metaphor, and story.27  It 
fits together some bits and pieces while omitting others.  In 
addition to historical facts and mathematical formulas, the report 
offers a narrative of neo-liberal globalization to shape our 
understandings of past and future.  Evaluating it as a narrative, we 
can understand it as constructed, rather than natural, to identify 
its presuppositions and implications for our lives. 
 
 
16 
 
Accordingly the analysis differs somewhat from traditional 
rhetoric.  The classical study of rhetoric interprets meaning and a 
speaker’s effectiveness at communicating that message. It treats a 
message in terms of its logos (argument), ethos (the speaker’s 
authority and tone), and pathos (the emotional pull on the 
audience exerted by the argument).  This goes beyond the sense of 
rhetoric in ordinary language, where it refers mainly to verbal 
ornaments added to persuade an audience aside from the 
substance of any argument.  But while the speaker’s “true” 
intention is a central concern, the classical version of rhetoric is 
not particularly concerned with relations of power structures to 
language. 
 
 
17 
 
By the late 1960s, however, the field of rhetoric takes an 
“ideological turn.”  Influenced by social movements, technological 
developments, and postmodern or poststructural thought, 
rhetoricians begin to examine ties between rhetoric and social 
theory.  A number of scholars insist that all communication 
connects to larger issues of politics and society.28  Thus Raymie 
McKerrow calls for a “critical rhetoric” that serves a “demystifying 
function by demonstrating the silent and often non-deliberate 
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ways in which rhetoric conceals as much as it reveals through its 
relationship with power/knowledge.”29  Following Michel 
Foucault, rhetoricians are analyzing the discursive field, to stress 
interrelationships among language, power, and social practices. 
 
18 
 
Discourse is “a language or system of representation that has 
developed socially in order to make and circulate a coherent set of 
meanings about an important topic area.  These meanings serve 
the interests of that section of society within which the discourse 
originates and which works ideologically to naturalize those 
meanings into common sense.”30  In this view, texts must be re-
connected to their social contexts for full understandings of their 
meanings.  No speech acts stay unaffected by the power relations 
that embed speakers.  Because postmodern rhetoricians construct 
a “coherent set of meanings,” they examine what exists positively 
as part of a particular text or speech, but they also explore 
omissions:  what do speakers ignore (or de-emphasize) for specific 
messages or images to make sense to listeners or viewers? 
 
 
19 
 
Many rhetoricians also shift from a concern with oratorical devices 
meant to induce particular responses and to a view that rhetoric 
runs all the way through a text.  This involves dropping the 
classical dichotomy between “rhetoric” and “logical argument.”  In 
postmodern rhetoric, all communication is rhetorical.  It is 
possible to separate form from substance, to imagine several ways 
of relating much the same point; yet in political practice, argument 
and delivery are inseparable.  Arguments themselves cannot be 
separated from their expression; a written text or a spoken work 
only exists as such.  Meanings do not divide simply into rational 
elements and emotional devices, but they are delivered whole with 
their social contexts. 
 
 
20 
 
Through postmodern rhetoric, the next section examines the 
realist tone of Globalization, Growth and Poverty to show how 
this legitimates the text while denigrating its critics.  The ensuing 
section uses “chains of equivalence” from Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe to explain how Globalization, Growth and 
Poverty attempts to brand globalization as the most effective tool 
for eliminating world poverty.  That leads to an analysis of how the 
counter-norms espoused by critics of neo-liberal globalization 
have been appropriated into World Bank rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 The Realist Style  
 21  As a whole, Globalization, Growth and Poverty projects an ethos  
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―a “realist” tone ―that claims sole legitimacy in the discussion.31  
This prepares the way for other tropes that reinforce the realist 
style of the report.  It engages in a meta-discursive discussion that 
self-authorizes the text.  Thus the report itself provides a 
description of the only acceptable grounds for discussion that 
limits potential criticism while shoring up it own position.  The 
report also provides a peculiar picture of the social world.  It 
reduces all politics to an economic calculus in which rational 
actors vie for power.  In this setting, the World Bank can say it 
seeks power, not for its own benefit, but as an institution that can 
use the natural laws of self-interest to protect people living in 
poverty.  The World Bank is not Machiavelli’s prince , but it can 
play by his rules to help the poor.  This twist can help to mask the 
economizing as benign; but the report still reduces politics to a 
single, often anti-political mode of behavior.  
 
22 
 
Globalization, Growth and Poverty uses this rhetoric to establish 
its central argument.  The master trope of this “realist style” is 
metonymy.  The description of realist rhetoric provided by Robert 
Hariman in studying The Prince is instructive:  “This style begins 
by marking all other discourses with the sign of the text:  It 
devalues other political actors because they are too discursive, too 
caught up in their textual designs to engage in rational 
calculation.”32  It aligns itself with the “real, natural” world by 
claiming objectivity and transparency.  James Arnt Aune argues 
that it is “the default rhetoric for defenders of the free market.  The 
realist economic style works by radically separating power and 
textuality, constructing the political realm as a state of nature, and 
by depicting its opponents as prisoners of verbal illusions.”33  A 
realist text purports merely to describe reality and therefore to 
avoid bias.  These claims hide its strategic selection of evidence to 
get the particular representations that serve its interests. 
 
 
23 
 
Advocates of neo-liberal globalization insistently deny their own 
rhetoricity.  David Dollar, Research Manager in the Development 
Research Group at the World Bank, says that “This report is a 
detailed and accurate statement of how global integration can 
benefit the poor, and as such it is fair and balanced.”34  The 
authors of the report claim that its market orientation is driven by 
observed results rather than ideology or theory.  Later changed to 
“Building an Inclusive World Economy,” the draft report’s subtitle 
was “Facts, Fears, and An Agenda for Action.”  The report as issued 
presents World Bank economists as truth-speakers but critics as 
Luddites for their “anti-industrial romanticism.”35  The claim to 
objectivity functions to preclude skepticism and deliberation.  
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Because the report is objective, it is realistic, leaving no reason to 
distrust its prescriptions. 
 
24 
 
Taking on its own personality and destiny, “globalization” becomes 
the protagonist in the text.  “Globalization” begins as a descriptive 
term; yet the report, with its continual placement of the noun as 
the subject in sentences, makes it a central actor in our political 
life.  It is “globalization” that leads to reductions in poverty ―not 
the politicians, bureaucrats or NGOs who make decisions 
regarding budgets, taxation, social spending, and trade.  As it 
becomes a character, globalization appears less responsive to our 
desires and plans; it appears to have a path independent of choices 
by other people. 
 
 
25 
 
The report’s language casts critics as obstructionists.  “Integration 
―or ‘globalization’―has generated anxieties about rising 
inequality, shifting power, and cultural uniformity.  This report 
assesses its impact and examines these anxieties.  Global 
integration is already a powerful force for poverty reduction, but it 
could be even more effective.  Some, but not all, of the anxieties 
are well-founded” (p. 1).  Criticisms are “anxieties,” and far from 
all are reasonable.  There is “a widespread anxiety is that growing 
integration is leading to heightened inequalities within countries,” 
but “usually this is not the case” (p. 5).  In fact, “between countries, 
globalization is now mostly reducing inequality” (p. 1).  Yes, 
“globalization does involve shifts in power, but these do not always 
favor the already powerful” (p. 2).  The critics are wrong; they lack 
the real, incontestable facts available to the Bank. 
 
 
26 
 
Worse, critics have narrow horizons and supposedly lack concern 
for people who live in poverty:  
 
 
 
A “development round” of trade liberalization should 
focus on improving market access of developing 
countries to rich country markets and to each other’s 
markets.  However, such a “development round” is 
threatened by narrow protectionist interests in the 
North.  Protectionists are seeking to load up the trade 
agenda with a host of other, institutional development 
issues.  If the rich countries insist on institutional 
harmonization in areas such as intellectual property 
rights and standards for health, labor, and the 
environment as a prerequisite for market access, then 
prospects for greater trade between North and South 
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will be greatly diminished (p. 9). 
 
 
 
In this passage, the Bank aligns neo-liberalism with global 
prosperity and critics with protectionism.  Implicitly it denigrates 
alternatives as irresponsible and self-interested.36  According to 
the report, “in part our agenda overlaps with the agenda of the 
streets, but it is diametrically opposed to the nationalism, 
protectionism and anti-industrial romanticism that is all too 
prominent” (p. 18).  Thus the World Bank hegemonizes the moral 
power of advocates for economic justice, while it links critics in 
civil society with at least two elements (nationalism and 
protectionism) that many in the global-justice movement reject 
and a third (anti-industrial romanticism) that depicts the 
movement as naïve. 
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Hariman continues, “the greatest advantage for the realist comes 
from constraining the wide array of public discourse ―keeping 
deliberation within a vernacular of sovereign powers, calculations 
of interest and the like.”37  This style delegitimates alternatives 
from the start.  If they are not based on considerations deemed 
worthy by the text, they are not reasonable or otherwise 
respectable.  Marginalization follows.  In this way, the report 
constricts human behavior to individual economic self-interest.  
The related ontology dictates proper goals for social institutions:  
economic growth and non-interference in the free market. 
 
 
28 
 
But the realist tone here is softened by the Bank’s proclaimed 
intent to increase global prosperity.  That is the only goal deemed 
worthy in the text, and the only way to achieve it is through free 
markets that can account for how “people really are.”  While the 
alleviation of poverty is certainly a goal of many, there are 
numerous interests in the developing and developed worlds.  This 
metonymy reduces people to a social unity and fails to take into 
account their variety of needs.  If someone makes a claim for an 
alternative value and denies globalization’s ability to address it, the 
claim is devalued as “romantic,” “anti-industrialist,” or 
“protectionist.”  It is a personal flaw, not a legitimate political 
concern. 
 
 
29 
 
The private market is characterized as an arena of unrivalled 
efficiency and opportunity, while non-economic social 
organization is always suspect.  The suggestion is that economic 
self-interest can lead to a virtuous, poverty-free society but that 
other values will disappoint.  For example, the report 
acknowledges that strong institutions are crucial in a free-market 
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system; yet it asks, “If effective institutions are needed to get 
strong benefits from openness, should countries wait until they 
have such institutions to open up?  Not necessarily.  One of the 
reasons why liberalization of trade in services is so important is 
that developing countries can use this market to improve the 
investment climate:  allowing foreign firms to provide financial 
services, telecommunications, and power” (p. 86).  What of the 
“inefficient regulation” and “corruption” that holds back firms in 
the developing world (p. 85)?  The report does not locate 
corruption in the private sector; instead the “free market” solves 
such problems.  It assumes that private firms would implement 
better regulatory schemes, since developing countries are 
encouraged to open their economies before attending to 
regulation.  Meanwhile trade deals are threatened not by 
environmentalists or labor-rights advocates but by “narrow 
protectionist interests” and by NGOs that may “exploit [people’s] 
ignorance to pursue their own agendas” (pp. 9 and 124).  The 
implication is that only those involved in market transactions can 
be trusted to help the poor. 
 
30 
 
Another manifestation of the realist claim to objectivity and the 
reduction of the social world to economics is the characterization 
of neo-liberal globalization as unavoidable.  This rhetoric denies 
the social construction of both the theoretical concept and material 
reality.  It presents this particular manifestation of power as the 
unfolding of natural laws.38  Neo-liberal globalization is part of the 
“grand narrative” of world history that is to structure the reader’s 
understanding of past and present.39  “Corporate financiers, as 
well as spokesmen for national government . . . use the language of 
capital mobility to obscure the notion that other choices have been 
possible.”40  In this spirit, the report claims that “a century ago 
globalization seemed as inevitable as it does today” (p. 4).  It 
discusses ways that globalization previously receded and might be 
rolled back in the future, but these are always unnatural and 
“vain,” leading to war, destruction, and poverty (p. 27). 
 
 
31 
 
The telos is economic integration on the way to global harmony.  
Neo-liberal economy becomes the only type of economy possible 
within this new reality.  “In many countries today, disengagement 
of politics from the economy is defended with reference to 
constraints of economic internationalization that would frustrate 
any other economic strategy.”41   Other models are portrayed as 
proven failures; only a fool would choose otherwise.  By denying 
contingency and choice, this rhetoric denies the possibility of 
deliberation.  It excludes critics from the table, since the plan of 
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action cannot differ.  If there is no choice among paths and 
economists can be trusted to frame the proper terms for 
proceeding, there is no reason for citizen engagement. 
 
32 
 
Yet realist rhetoric can be characterized by an inability to fully 
account for itself.42  In its denigration of politics and 
communication, it ends up unable to explain the full range of 
human behavior, as promised.  It has acute trouble facing its own 
frustrations.  When its predictions do not materialize but its critics 
do, the rhetoric reaches erratically beyond its core categories.  As 
“free-market” reforms lead to economic crises in the developing 
world, for example, advocates begin to stress the need for effective 
“institutions” of other kinds.  These add to requirements for 
development and increase costs of compliance, but they do not 
modify neo-liberal theories or imply that neo-liberal reforms might 
be to blame for problems (p. 10).43  Like a “pathology of rational-
choice,” neo-liberal rhetoric claims an exemption to charges of 
failure on the grounds that previously unforeseen (but logical) 
components of the formula were insufficiently addressed in 
practice.  But if “non-accountable non-governmental 
organizations” cannot be trusted to pursue agendas other than 
their own, how can the World Bank expect the non-interference it 
claims to need (p. 124)? 
 
 
33 
 
The ruling logic of neo-liberal globalization requires a purity in 
practice that its own principles imply it could not have.  According 
to neo-liberals, free markets do not fail in the developing world; 
they do not get tried there.  IFI policies run into trouble, say neo-
liberals, because of continued rent-seeking on the part of 
developing societies.  Somehow these societies do not include the 
markets or the IFIs.  Nor on the other side do their insufficient 
services, deficiencies in democratic sovereignty, or neo-colonial 
relations with the developed world surface as intrinsic 
impediments.  Politics are inefficient and corrupt; economics are 
efficient and virtuous.  If only the neo-liberal economic model were 
fully implemented, it would lead to the most prosperous, equitable, 
and environmentally sustainable society possible.  Sadly, politics 
are allowed to intrude.  This crucial step in neo-liberal apologies 
has no place in neo-liberal theories. 
 
 
 
 Branding “Globalization”  
 
34 
 
Enabled by its realist tone, Globalization, Growth and Poverty 
argues for beneficial consequences of globalization.  In doing so, 
IFI discourse attempts to brand its prescriptions as the one way to  
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fulfill its mandate to alleviate poverty worldwide.  The branding 
occurs as advocates of neo-liberal globalization link their project to 
a variety of social goods.  Laclau and Mouffe call these “chains of 
equivalence,” to indicate how discourses work through connecting 
objects and ideas to modify their meanings for audiences.44  Some 
links are positive, tying items together; other links are negative, 
shedding previous associations.  The report ties globalization 
positively to “free markets” but negatively to “deforestation” and 
“sub-Saharan Africa,” working to divorce globalization from those 
objects. 
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Globalization, Growth and Poverty repeats some chains or 
clusters to gain consent for globalization.  The fundamental link is 
between globalization and poverty reduction.  According to the 
foreword, “the focus of our research is the impact of economic 
integration on developing countries and especially on the poor 
people living in these countries” (p. ix).  The report seeks 
credibility for the World Bank as an advocate for poor.  Indeed it 
implies that the Bank has no predetermined concern except for the 
welfare of those who live in poverty. 
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The very title of the report, “Globalization, Growth and Poverty,” 
connects these three elements:  globalization leads to growth, 
which alleviates poverty.  The opening paragraph affirms this: 
“global integration is already a powerful force for poverty 
reduction” (p. 1).  The penultimate sentence restates it:  “Many 
poor people are benefiting from globalization” (p. 159).  These 
links are so insistent in the report that they eclipse its 
acknowledgment of disputes about them.  “Globalization” and 
“openness” are “pro-poor,” producing “poverty reduction,” 
“growth,” “rising productivity,” “opportunity,” [economic] 
“convergence,” “weakened monopolies,” and a “raise in per capita 
income.”  Globalization virtually comes to mean poverty reduction, 
so that critics who resist economic integration are pursuing 
policies that necessarily will harm the poor. 
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Throughout the report, examples of newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) provide further links between growth and globalization.  
India, China, Hungary, Brazil, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, and 
Argentina (!) supposedly show that economic integration 
diminishes poverty.  The financial crises experienced by many of 
these countries get mentioned, but the report sheds most of the 
negativity associated with such disruptions.  It minimizes their 
impact while portraying them as necessary steps to future 
stability:  “we would like to emphasize the distinction that being 
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open financially is associated with greater stability, whereas 
becoming open financially is often associated with financial and 
exchange rate crises” (p. 70).  The report does not address the 
social and political stresses caused by open trade; nor does it 
notice that economic disruptions and dismantled state services 
place enormous pressures on populations and governments.  The 
Argentine collapse occurred after the report went to press, but its 
neglect of impending troubles is telling.  The report de-links 
negative representations from global trade, giving it a relentlessly 
cheerful image. 
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The report also sheds any responsibility of globalization for 
“marginalized countries,” including many in Africa and the former 
Soviet Union.  It treats them as foils for the successful integrators.  
Awkward countries (including sub-Saharan Africa) and histories 
(like colonialism) get distanced rhetorically from globalization.  
They have been marginalized, the report explains, because of 
adverse geography and climate as well as poor (internal) policies 
and infrastructure (p. 7).  The report mentions capital flight from 
Africa but sees it as an exodus of domestic wealth in search of 
security and profit rather than a response to capital volatility 
induced by global trade (p. 41).  The report ignores the legacies of 
colonization, failed privatization, loan conditionality, and debt 
crises.  The marginal countries appear to have failed in a historical 
vacuum, without any ties to international dynamics.  The text does 
include a critical discussion of trade barriers in the OECD 
countries; but it focuses on the current scene and neglects any 
consideration of potentially valid reasons for maintaining certain 
tariffs, subsidies, or quotas.  The notion that Africa is poor because 
it cannot join the global market since it has a bad climate is poor 
social science, it masks the entire colonial experience, and it leaves 
any blame to corrupt domestic politicians or bad luck.  (The Bank 
is there to help.)  De-linking poverty from Africa’s history of 
colonization, then Western neglect and domination, the rhetoric 
crafts a sense of the situation amenable to the World Bank’s 
project of globalization. 
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The presentation of economic data in Globalization, Growth and 
Poverty links neo-liberal globalization to “Science.”  Contributing 
to the realist tone of the report, the data imply an authority that 
cannot be questioned.  The principal author describes the report, 
with its abundant tables and statistics, as a “detailed and accurate 
statement.” 45  The report includes 55 graphs, tables, and maps in 
159 pages.  This profusion of data suggests that the report is a 
collection of facts speaking for themselves -- and all saying the 
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same thing:  globalization is good.  Yet the data come from 
statistical analysis that varies with the specification of models, 
which varies across hosts of debatable assumptions.  This is why, 
as McCloskey says, economics must work through “trust, 
conversation, persuasion.”46  Instead the report offers its data as 
expert, neutral verdicts.  The report is reality speaking.  McCloskey 
cautions that “The suppression of the ‘I’ in scientific writing is 
more significant than one might think . . . the scientist says:  It is 
not I the scientist who make these assertions but reality itself.  . . . 
Scientists pretend that Nature speaks directly, thereby effacing the 
evidence that they the scientists are responsible for the assertions.  
. . . The scientist avoids being questioned for his reliability by 
disappearing into a third-person narrative of what really 
happened.”47 
 
40 
 
The report could have emphasized factors that it instead largely 
ignores, such as civil-society input. Its exclusive attention to 
econometric analysis shapes not only the conclusions but even the 
conceptions of questions and possible answers.  This “methodism” 
can lead to a neglect of contextual factors and “foster a technicism, 
instrumentalism, and impatience that obscure political 
complexities.”48  Of course, the quality of empirical evidence 
depends on the quality of data-gathering, which can be notoriously 
difficult in the developing world.  In some cases, the difficulty 
appears to be intentionally concealed.  One telephone survey cited 
by the report asked 20,000 people in 20 countries whether they 
thought “globalization would materially benefit their families,” and 
it found that people answered in the affirmative by a 2-to-1 margin 
(p. 15).  The original draft notes that the poor were more or less 
excluded, because they often lack telephones, but the published 
report omits this niggling detail. 
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The report pays little attention to studies by economists who 
contest the power of open trade to improve the lives of the poor.  
“The doubts that one can retain about each individual study,” it 
says, “threaten to block our view of the overall forest of evidence” 
(p. 5).  In a sidebar, the report acknowledges the Rodriguez and 
Rodrick criticism of measures used to gauge trade openness, then 
it turns back to evidence for links between open trade and growth 
as though the criticism had never arisen (p. 37).  The report 
presents the community of trained economists as relatively united; 
it barely notes the increasingly loud debate.  The report simply 
claims that the “preponderance” of expert-derived evidence 
supports globalization (p. 5), and it minimizes the fact that several 
 
Elizabeth Markovits 47 Poroi, 3, 1, June, 2004 
prominent economists reach different conclusions. 
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By equating its practice of economics with the one true science, the 
report and other advocates of globalization disarm calls for greater 
public input into technocratic organizations.   This occurs in two 
ways.  First, with economics presented as science, globalization 
advocates can do away with politics.  This logic turns around what 
Susan Bickford says about Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:  “there 
are certain things about which we simply do not deliberate, such as 
. . . the principles of mathematics.  . . . we only deliberate about 
‘things that are in our power and can be realized by action.’  . . . we 
deliberate in order to act.”49  As pure economics, development 
projects become applications of mathematical rules.  We cannot 
change these “rules” through communicative action, nor should we 
want to.  At the same time, the increasing influence of IFIs and 
trade regimes can shrink the sphere of politics.  It becomes 
technical management by an elite who may summarize its case for 
the public but is excused from open debate of ends and means.50 
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Second is the problem of accessibility.  If the World Bank’s 
emphasis on participation is taken at all seriously, its report would 
edify citizens on advantages and costs of globalization.51  Given the 
contestation among economists, how can citizens judge conflicting 
economic data?  According to the report, people living on less than 
$1 a day in the new globalizers declined by 120 million between 
1993 and 1998 (p. 2).  According to Joseph Stiglitz, people living 
on less than $2 a day increased by 100 million in the 1990s.52  Can 
both be right?  Who is correct?  How does one decide?  The report 
does not seek to help citizens think their ways through such 
questions.  It provides no glossary, index, of general explanation of 
its statistical analyses.  The implication is that the report speaks 
for the scientists and the realities:  now citizens must agree. 
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The report’s attempted metonymy, turning globalization into 
economic growth, ignores three developments.  First, as Rodrick 
points out, many of the most successful NICs arose as highly 
regulated, development-oriented states, with tight controls over 
investment and trade.53  Second, there are many developmental 
goals, not just one.  Often touted as a model of liberalization, 
China has attained great growth, with a developmental-state 
apparatus, yet it “is an environmental nightmare . . . [and] 
systematically represses human rights and worker’s rights.”54  
Third, open trade strains poor populations and national 
governments, inducing politics that undo free markets.55  The 
report is not entitled to identify globalization with economic 
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growth while omitting a fuller account of its elements and 
dynamics.  
 
 
 Ironic Appropriations  
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Counter-public groups are bringing various development issues to 
public consciousness.  On its Web site, Global Trade Watch, a 
division of Public Citizen, says that its activism focuses on “health 
and safety, environmental protection, economic justice, and 
democratic, accountable governance.”56  The Ruckus Society, 
which has been active in global justice protest actions, “provides 
training in the skills of non-violent civil disobedience to help 
environmental and human rights organizations.”57  The platform 
of the U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice (or “50 Years Is 
Enough”) includes calls for greater openness in IFIs and “an end to 
all environmentally destructive lending and support.58  Such 
counter-public groups promote debt relief, peace issues, anti-
capitalist and anti-corporate causes, environmental protection, 
workers’ rights, and more. 
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Richard Falk calls these “world order priorities” and claims that 
they “relate, first and foremost, to protecting the planet and its 
inhabitants from the ongoing gathering of destructive tendencies 
that currently threaten human well-being and the viability of the 
global commons.  . . . [They] also extend to affirming an ethos of 
human solidarity.”59  As these counter-norms exert pressure, the 
rhetoric of IFIs shifts.  We can see this in the report’s attempt to 
disperse tensions from these critiques by appropriating their 
values within the Bank’s own discourse.60 
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Rhetorical chains in Globalization, Growth and Poverty treat 
globalization as the route to economic growth solutions for many 
social problems.  Four of the report’s sections cite critics to identify 
a range of social problems.  The report’s strategy is to show how 
globalization alleviates them or does no further damage.  Its 
hegemonizing rhetoric is clearly exhibited in these sections:  
“Social protection in globalizing economies,” “Globalization and 
power,” “Globalization and culture,” and “Globalization and the 
environment.”  The report includes the values espoused by critics 
in the list of worthy goals that the World Bank hopes to achieve 
through globalization.  The concessions are partial at most.  Thus 
the Bank does not advocate a more cautious approach to free trade 
in order to protect against “Americanization,” but claims that only 
globalization can lead to cultural diversity.  In these acts of ironic 
appropriation, the discourse attempts to broaden the base of 
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consent to its policies.  It recomposes meanings to absorb criticism 
and renew support, but it does not acceptance other voices as 
equal contributors to a broader development project.  It re-asserts 
the Bank’s unified authority, and it rejects any role for deliberation 
or democratic decision-making.  Implicitly it denies that the report 
is partisan and suggests that the critics are self-interested.  
Coupled with the realist tone of the report, the rhetoric offers at 
best a fatherly pat on the head. 
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The report specifically seeks to quell criticism as a threat to the 
consensus that the Bank imputes to its mission.  The 
environmental movement has provided a strong challenge to free-
trade advocates, and the report devotes several pages to green 
concerns.  Global Trade Watch argues for greater environmental 
protection and connects degradation with an unregulated 
economic sphere.  The report claims that the World Bank shares 
green goals and that globalization is the way to a cleaner planet.  It 
cites a study that links globalization to improved air quality in 
industrial centers (p. 16); and its section on “Globalization and 
Environment” takes what at first appears to be a very sober look at 
environmental degradation throughout the world, addressing 
“beggar-thyself” environmental standards (p. 130).  Yet the report 
finds that evidence does not support the fear of a “race to the 
bottom.”  It says that industries servicing domestic demands 
produce the most pollution, it argues that Western subsidiaries do 
not appear to pollute more than indigenous industries, and it says 
that they tend to adopt “near-uniform” standards throughout their 
corporate structures (p. 132). 
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But the claims that Chevron pollutes no more in Nigeria than in 
Mississippi and pollutes less than would a domestic firm are cold 
comfort to environmentalists.  The report concedes that “many 
countries are simply not implementing pollution abatement 
measures that are readily available, cheap, and effective” (p. 134). 
 Again, though, the report frames the issues as if these countries 
exist in a vacuum, with pollution the fault of domestic rather than 
international actors.  The report lists local popular movements, 
effective domestic regulation, and international collective action 
(but only with regard to global warming, put into a different 
section than the more general “pollution”) as the keys to 
environmental protection.  It says that globalization facilitates 
these through spreading “innovative idea[s]” (p. 143).  It portrays 
as a “protectionist” ploy the notion that “institutional 
harmonization in areas such as . . . the environment” might 
become “a prerequisite for market access” (p. 9).  The report 
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embraces open markets as the only path to social goods, while it 
derides stricter regulations for environmental or other reasons. 
 
50 
 
Critics also complain about the lack of participation in the policy 
formation for open trade.  The report calls for increased 
participation of developing countries in trade negotiations, but it 
ignores democratizing trade institutions to focus on encouraging 
developing countries to improve their own cooperation and 
knowledge bases (pp. 63-64).  Considering the moral traction of 
the global-justice movement, the appropriation is logical.  The 
report’s advocacy of globalization must compete with counter-
publics, but it can only do so by acknowledging their validity then 
shifting blame so that actual bets get placed on open markets.  The 
report repeatedly invokes the importance of participation, but it 
insistently paints civil societies as a rent-seeking and 
untrustworthy partners for trade.  At first, the report lauds 
“globalization from below” as a way to limit the unrestrained 
power of capital.  It even cites civil-society pressure on De Beers in 
response to its diamond buying practices in Africa (p. 124).  In the 
same paragraph, though, the report maintains that civil 
involvement “is not an unmitigated good.  Non-accountable non-
governmental organizations . . . can sometimes exploit [popular] 
ignorance to pursue their own agendas at the expense of poor 
people” (p. 124). 
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The reports coöpts criticisms also by linking globalization to stable 
levels of inequality.  Unregulated economic expansion actually 
aggravates socioeconomic stratification.61  When the report 
acknowledges increasing inequalities within OECD economies, it 
finds causes other than free trade:  “A part of this may be due to 
immigration.  However, it may also have been due to policy 
changes on taxation and social spending unconnected to 
globalization.  . . . globalization has probably been equalizing” (p. 
48).  Yet changes in tax structures connect with globalization.  
Countries engage in tax competition to attract business and 
capital, and they locate more jobs in the informal or lower-wage 
service sectors when they let corporations “use extra ‘flexibility’ in 
labor laws . . . to shed and downsize.”62 
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The report denies that inequality has increased in low-income 
countries, save for China (p. 48), but this is a dubious claim.63  The 
reports notes contrary evidence only once:  “They find no 
relationship between changes in openness and changes in 
inequality.  . . . Ravallion qualifies this result.  He finds that 
although on average openness does not affect inequality, in low-
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income countries it is associated with greater inequality.  
Regardless of its net effect, there are winners and losers from trade 
policies.  . . . The combination of rapid growth with no systematic 
change in inequality has dramatically reduced absolute poverty in 
the new globalizers” (pp. 48-49).  A page later, the last paragraph 
concludes that “globalization clearly can be a force for poverty 
reduction.”  So the report asserts that globalization means low-
income countries have greater inequality yet greater equality.  It 
buries the complexity of the situation in contradictory claims and 
unexplained data.  Its rhetoric offers claims “regardless of net 
effect,” when its conclusions base themselves on net effects.  
Overall it elides the unhappy effects of increased stratification on 
those least equipped to bear it. 
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Globalization, Growth and Poverty encourages countries to 
develop various programs of social protection.  These are to target 
both formal- and informal-sector employees as integration brings 
about (merely) short-term dislocations (p. 87).  Yet the report also 
says that a large public-employment sector would limit the 
benefits of globalization and that the imposition of a standard set 
of labor regulations across the globe is of doubtful benefit.  
Meanwhile the report promotes greater liberalization of trade 
through privatizing services and providing competition in primary 
utilities such as power and water delivery.  It gives developing 
countries the option of financing short-term unemployment 
insurance schemes, with the hope that the economy will recover 
from crisis before its funds run out. Considering that standards 
would vary from one country to the next, that tax structures would 
vary, and there would be a greater emphasis on privatization and a 
“sound investment climate,” it is hard to see how a “race to the 
bottom” would not occur.  The report accepts social protection as a 
necessity, given the (short-term) volatility from liberalizing trade, 
but its neo-liberal provisions leave acceptable measures for social 
protection hard to imagine. 
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Critics worry about the “Americanization” of world culture as U.S. 
brand names become consumables of choice around the world.  
The report replies that economic integration increases “diversity.”  
McDonald’s has brought “hamburgers to Britain, co-existing with 
fish and chips” (p. 15).  Ikea has entered Russian markets but “has 
not driven out Russian style” (p. 129).  To show that Wal-Mart has 
not driven out of business every other general store in North 
Carolina is not to make it a harbinger of cosmopolitanism or a 
model for labor policy.  The report seems to equate “diversity” with 
the spread of large corporations throughout the world.  Here is a 
 
Elizabeth Markovits 52 Poroi, 3, 1, June, 2004 
rhetoric of homogenous diversity. 
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Discussing the potential for American cultural hegemony, the 
report offers a seemingly candid assessment of global impact by 
American films and brands (p. 130).  Yet it concludes that 
“globalization does limit the independence of national government 
in some dimensions, but governments have many degrees of 
freedom to manage the interaction between trade, capital, and 
labor flows, on the one hand, and national culture and 
environment on the other.  . . . globalization is consistent with the 
maintenance of a vibrant culture” (p. 142).  Criticisms of 
homogenizing by globalizing are too widespread and plausible to 
be brushed aside like this. 
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In the effort to suture growing fissures, the report seeks to 
subsume commonsense values such as environmental protection 
and decent equality within its hegemonic worldview.  Neo-liberal 
discourse coöpts criticisms by claiming to share their ends and 
better their means.  Open trade becomes the scientific path to 
whatever goals seem defensible.  The report crafts a vision of 
market globalization that acknowledges and incorporates many 
values cited by counter-publics.  No matter how diluted or 
morphed, of course, some values remain rhetorically incompatible 
with neo-liberal trade, whereupon the document tells us how 
unrealistic they are.  Then the report denies any validity to the 
associated criticisms.  It ignores them as extremist, it dismisses 
their proponents as delusional, and it contrasts these with the 
objective truth-seekers who advocate globalization. 
 
 
 
 Technocracy and the Public  
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Many affected by neo-liberal globalization have it imposed on 
them.  Still it is striking that resistance has been largely silent or 
sporadic.  Advocates of globalization have been able to find many 
supporters in the developing world as well as the developed 
world.64  If globalization were just economic policy, this might not 
be surprising, but it also generates a particular political 
subjectivity.  Although it remains popular to talk about 
“democracy” as politics worth struggling and even dying for, there 
is a little mainstream discussion of how this form of global 
economy might pre-empt people’s democratic ability to determine 
what policies their country will follow.  As a discourse, 
globalization normalizes non-democratic politics by assuming that 
(1) economics is a natural science, (2) public needs can be 
addressed best by markets, so (3) publics should step aside to let 
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economies and economists function naturally to determine social 
conditions. 
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The World Bank is a large organization with varied interests and 
multiple legacies.  Its report on Globalization, Growth and 
Poverty often acknowledges the need for local input and the 
existence of many paths toward development.  Yet many of the 
report’s passages and the Bank’s policies, like those of corollary 
institutions such as the IMF and the WTO, endorse only the route 
of neo-liberal reform.  It becomes the objective output of scientific 
analysis, the one way to rid developing countries of “special 
interests,” and the best way to achieve such desirable results as less 
inequality, environmental protection, and global diversity.  Giving 
short shrift to dissenters, neo-liberal discourse presents itself as 
the consensus of mainstream economists, the only experts on 
development.  Turning politics into economics, neo-liberalism 
makes the policy landscape increasingly “technocratic.” 
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“Politics,” as Frank Fischer writes, are “increasingly reduced to the 
technically oriented task of ‘keeping the machine running.’  
Economic and political guidance becomes more a problem of 
planning and management than an issue for public deliberations, 
and, as such, is seen as a job for which only the experts are 
uniquely equipped.”65  Make no mistake:  these anti-politics are 
highly political.  They require publics that consent to their 
formation as audiences or clients rather than participants.  Neo-
liberal discourse secures the consent tacitly through its rhetorical 
construction of the social world.  It presupposes necessity (as 
opposed to contingency) and self-regulating orders (rather than 
collective problems).66  In the neo-liberal world, the best path to 
success is public disengagement.  Once that occurs, necessity and 
the natural laws of the market can function under the oversight of 
academically trained economists rather than rent-seeking publics. 
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Unfortunately this economic technocracy is not radically out-of-
step with some current “democratic theory.”  The definition of 
democracy most prevalent in political science, national 
governments, and institutions like Freedom House continues to be 
Joseph Schumpeter’s:  “the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote.”67  Democracy becomes a mere method, 
implying a view of citizen as consumers and of politicians as the 
centers of power.  Supposedly this prefers no particular outcomes 
or inclusions.  Once the people choose elites, participation ends 
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until the next election.  This eliminates the “danger” that public 
participation might affect policies.  Social scientists often treat this 
as the most accurate way to define “democracy,” and “the 
contemporary theory of democracy does not merely describe the 
operation of certain political systems, but implies that this is the 
kind of system that we should value.”68  Purported description 
becomes prescription, and publics grow accustomed to low levels 
of participation within elite-led systems.  Technocracy requires 
elites, not masses.  Within a globalized system, this conception of 
democracy threatens to obscure the transfer of power to IFIs, and 
it promises to normalize public deference to their decisions. 
 
 
 
Possibilities for a 
Counter-Hegemonic Project  
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Globalization, Growth and Poverty tells us a good deal about the 
character of citizenship within the emerging situations of 
globalization.  First, its realism as a rhetorical style depicts critics 
of neo-liberalism as naïve romantics, incapable of understanding 
the “real world” where globalization works.  Advocates of open 
trade are the only ones who can see the world clearly and tell it like 
it is.  Whether aware of it or not, critics engage in misleading 
rhetorical strategies. 
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Closely related, the report brands globalization as the way to aid 
the world’s poor.  It articulates chains of equivalence that link neo-
liberal globalization favorably with economic science and resulting 
policies to reduce poverty.  Simultaneously it discredits possible 
ties for globalization to negative developments such as polluted 
environments, increasing gaps between haves and have-nots, or 
prevention of popular participation. 
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To quell increasing criticism faced by IFIs, neo-liberal discourse 
claims to include the values of counter-publics.  It revises their 
meanings to suit its mission.  It presents itself as open to criticism, 
yet it attempts to eliminate any effective space for critics to operate 
persuasively. 
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Fourth, the neo-liberal discourse of IFIs promotes voluntarily non-
participatory publics.  Its assumptions about economics and 
politics render public participation marginal at best.  If economics 
is a pure and natural science, able to specify singular and 
necessary prescriptions for social problems, and if markets can 
address a wide variety of social goals, there is little need for 
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political activity by ordinary people. 
 
65 
 
These tropes pose significant challenges to critics of neo-liberal 
globalization.  Yet there remain openings for counter-hegemonic 
projects.  The strength of the dominant discourse lies in its ability 
to regulate debate:  absorbing criticisms or dismissing them as 
irrational.  But the fact that neo-liberal discourse must make the 
effort to hegemonize and encompass counter-norms is heartening.  
Some see this characteristic as one of the most frustrating qualities 
of the discourse, and I agree.  Let us not, however, miss the 
counter-power apparent in this situation. 
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Neo-liberal discourse focuses on the realm of consent.  It 
maintains authority for the project of globalization by 
hegemonizing commonsense counter-norms of equality 
promotion, environmental protection, and poverty reduction.  The 
power of those counter-norms to secure consent surfaces when 
critics start to reframe debate.  We can have politics only when we 
have some shared understandings and values that enable us to 
make sense to one another.  This is keeping alternative values alive 
on both sides of the debate, even though their meanings become 
highly contested. 
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Critics can take advantage of the play in meanings to keep neo-
liberal discourse from eliminating counter-indications and 
criticisms.  The task can be arduous, especially in publics 
dominated by neo-liberal institutions.  Yet movements against 
globalization suggest that some room remains for contesting such 
neo-liberal assertions as market mechanisms provide best for 
environmental protection.  Publication of counter-evidence is 
starting to seem fairly effective.  The report’s impressive efforts to 
hegemonize counter-claims testifies to this, and that kind of 
articulation opens neo-liberal discourse to further dispute. 
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Moral traction for democracy means significant possibilities for 
critique.  There are no promises for success.  Contradictions in a 
discourse or a practice need not find some progressive resolution.  
To expose fissures within neo-liberal globalization nonetheless can 
become a step toward undermining its power.  To distinguish 
participatory from liberal democracy can help.  Where neo-liberal 
globalization seems less than effective, objective, necessary, or 
coherent, doubts can arise.  In turn, these can weaken the consent 
that neo-liberal globalization wants to win from ordinary people as 
well as elites.  Rhetoricians who help to denaturalize globalization 
can contribute significantly to the ensuing politics. 
 
Elizabeth Markovits 56 Poroi, 3, 1, June, 2004 
 
 
 
 
© Elizabeth Markovits, 2004.  
 
 
 Notes  
 
 
 
1     World Bank, Globalization, Growth and Poverty:  Building an 
Inclusive World Economy, Washington, DC, World Bank and 
Oxford University Press, 2002.  See 
http://econ.worldbank.org/prr/globalization/ text-2857/ to access 
the full text on the internet.  The publication was repeatedly 
delayed after the cancellation of the World Bank meetings for 
September 29, 2001, but was previously available in draft form:  
World Bank, Globalization, Growth and Poverty:  Facts, Fears, 
and an Agenda for Action, Draft Policy Research Report, August 
6, 2001.  After several NGOs obtained copies and openly criticized 
its findings, its existence was first publicized by Alan Beattie:  
“World Bank Report to Defend Globalisation,” Financial Times, 
September 14, 2000, p. 6.  The original subtitle has since been 
changed to “Building an Inclusive World Economy.” 
 
 
 
 
2     The report does not describe the intended audience, but the 
report figured prominently in the “Publications” section of the 
World Bank’s Web site.  This warrants the assumption that the 
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